To reconstruct the philosophy of St Thomas must we include, as an integral part of the system, his teaching concerning the heavenly bodies? One would hardly think so were we to judge by the attention devoted to this theme in classic expositions of Thomism such as those of Gilson and Sertillanges. However, in this study, Dr Litt argues that an historical examination of the writings of St Thomas clearly establishes that his references to the heavenly bodies are not merely incidental (...) and by way of example. In many important respects they are proposed by St Thomas as genuinely metaphysical assertions fulfilling an important and positive role in the elaboration of his philosophy. (shrink)

The nature of the Plague described by Thucydides in Book 2, chapter 49, has long been discussed both by medical and by classical scholars. Of numerous suggested identifications none has found general approval; and it is doubtful whether any opinion is more prevalent today than that the problem is insoluble. The classical scholar is handicapped by his ignorance of medical science; his medical colleague has often been led astray by translations deficient in exactitude if not disfigured by error. The difficulties (...) are great enough: but there is one indispensable preliminary task which can be undertaken with some prospect of success. If Thucydides' description is to be compared with modern records, it is necessary first to determine what the Greek words mean; and that can only be done by determining how far the Greek is expressed in the technical terms of contemporary medical science. It is obvious that Thucydides required a special vocabulary for this part of his work; and in fact over forty words in chapters 49 and 50 are unexampled elsewhere in his History, and a dozen more are used in meanings unexampled elsewhere. It is certain that a number of medical treatises were in circulation in Thucydides' lifetime, and that a more or less standard vocabulary had been or was being established. Now if it can be shown that the great majority of the terms employed by Thucydides in ch. 49 recur, apparently with the same meanings, as standard terms in the contemporary doctors, our second task—the comparison of Thucydides' description with modern records—will become a more rational undertaking than it was before, no longer the doubtful speculation which many of the modern doctors suppose it to be, thinking as they do that they have to deal with a layman's generalities expressed in literary language. (shrink)

The history of the National Health Service research ethics system in the UK and some of the key drivers for its change into the present system are described. It is suggested that the key drivers were the unnecessary delay of research, the complexity of the array of processes and contradictions between research ethics committee (REC) decisions. It is then argued that the primary drivers for this change are and will be replicated by the systems of research ethics review being put (...) in place at UK universities in response to the Economic and Social Research Council research ethics framework. It is argued that this is particularly problematic for multi-centre review and for researchers who switch institutions. Finally, some potential solutions to this problem and their feasibility are discussed. (shrink)

Purpose. The research is devoted to the analysis of the urgent problem of the information society: the overload of a person with information and, as a result, the impossibility of adequate formation and development of the personality; as well as the problem of "digitization" of human existence and the formation of a new reality of dataism. Theoretical basis. A lot of modern scientific works are devoted to the analysis of the information society, its problems and features. The information society is (...) a logical continuation of the scientific and technological revolution, which led to the rapid growth of scientific knowledge and the technology development. In the 20th century, technologies have touched the sphere of knowledge and information, as a result of which the formation and development of the information society, or "knowledge society", takes place. Information becomes the main resource in it, and, one way or another, a person’s life is inextricably connected with the information space. With the information society formation, the problem of information search and processing becomes one of the most urgent. It turns out that despite the abundance and availability of information, it is very difficult to determine its relevance. A lot of effort is spent on developing information retrieval algorithms. Another problem is related to the person’s inability to process large amounts of data. This situation begins to influence not only the education process and professional activity, but also the formation of a person’s personality. A person is "lost" in the information space and gradually loses his/her "I". Algorithms for data analysis come to the rescue, but gradually, instead of giving a person material for thought, they begin to make decisions on their own, and therefore, live life instead of a person. With the advent of Big Data processing algorithms, a new ideological paradigm appears – dataism, which predicts the merger of a person with the general data flow. Originality. The authors make assumptions that the dataistic future is "natural". A lot of works, including in the framework of philosophy, are focused on the problem of "dissolving" a person in the information space and finding ways to overcome it. But, in our opinion, this process is a completely logical continuation of human evolution. Conclusions. Existence of a person as a data flow is not a problem and a threat, but a new dimension of his/her being, and, therefore, requires a careful study and formulation of the main principles of this form of existence. (shrink)

See Lobel, Proc. British Academy xxxv. 1 ff., June 1950. I. col. ii. 1. γυ[ ]… εδον [ο]κ εκαсμ τι εκсματι = εκαсμι, ‘by guessing’, seems at least as likely as εκαсμ τι = εδωλν τι ‘[At first I could not make out who or what it was: but when] I saw Gyges [clearly,] not by guesswork, I was afraid of a plot for murder.’ For example: ΓΓ[γην сα][ε]εδον, [ο]κ εκсματι, κτλ. For the relation of εκαсμα to εκζω, cf. κλαсμα, (...) κμπαсμα, βριсμα, etc. (shrink)

The causal representative theory of perception dominated theory of knowledge for hundreds of years after it was put on the map by Descartes and Locke. It is now almost extinct. How could this happen? The theory collapsed because it could not explain how we acquire knowledge of the external world, since it presupposes a causally organized system of external objects producing sensations in us. This presupposition, however, is generally recognized as true, so that the pattern of causal inference at the (...) heart of the theory is surely justified. The theory cannot explain how we originally acquire our knowledge of the external world, but it is entitled on a second pass to correct our empirical beliefs, where necessary. This includes replacing our naive picture of the physical world with a more sophisticated scientific conception, which downgrades secondary qualities. This was, indeed, the main reason why it was originally introduced by Descartes and Locke, and has been the source of its attraction over the years. (shrink)

The contents of Scala Graduum Caloris are described, supplemented by unpublished material. Both temperature measurements by his linseed oil thermometer and those based upon his law of cooling are shown to be reasonably accurate to 300°C, but above that value they are much too low. The apparent agreement and the deviation are explained by the differences between the assumptions that Newton made in deriving his law of cooling and the conditions in which he used it. Newton's attempts to link terrestrial (...) and celestial science in applications in the Principia are shown to fail from his confounding the concepts of temperature, heat and radiant intensity and his ignorance of most factors affecting the temperature rise of irradiated materials. Other comments on varied aspects of heat, mainly published in the Queries, are set out and analysed. His originality is assessed. (shrink)

The classical argument for the existence of other minds begins by ascribing states of consciousness to oneself, and argues to the existence of other conscious beings on the basis of an analogy in bodily constitution and behavior. P. F. Strawson attacks the foundation of this argument. “One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience.” My thesis is that (...) this objection depends on running together the two distinct necessary conditions for ascribing states of consciousness. There is the conceptual condition (a general concept of consciousness); and there is the referential condition (the capacity to identify suitable subjects).A version of the argument from analogy is also developed which does not presuppose an original consciousness that my experiences are mine. The general concept of experience is by itself enough for the original specification of all experiences associated with body M, because other experiences which also conform to the concept are not introduced until the argument from analogy is complete. (shrink)